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Visions and Values: Ethical Reflections in a Jamesian Key 
David E. Leary 
University of Richmond 
The purpose of this article is to provide a quick survey of William James's views on the 
plurality of visions that humans have regarding reality, as a background for more extensive 
discussions of his views on the plurality of values that orient human thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors, as well as his views on the enactment of those values through active resist· 
ance to the ways things are and the risk-taking involved in striving to improve the 
human condition. Consonant with pluralism itself, I intend this discussion to open up 
rather than close off further considerations of James's views on ethics. 
Pluralism, as proposed by William James, is generally taken to pertain to ontology 
and epistemology: to the study of what is and what we can know, or in more 
Jamesian terms, to the study of the variety of things (or facts) and the variety of 
perspectives (or visions) embedded in the stream of experience. This concentration 
on ontology and epistemology is not surprising since James himself focused primarily 
on these matters in his classic work on A Pluralistic Universe. Nevertheless, ] ames 
was committed to the proposition that pluralism also pertains to ethics: to the 
study of what we can and should do, or in more Jamesian terms, to the study of 
the variety of priorities (or values) that humans should enact. 1 
I would like to dedicate this article to M. Brewster Smith, who over a long and productive career 
has kept ethical issues in mind and brought a variety of ethical concerns to the attention of his 
fellow psychologists. Requests for reprints should be sent to David E. Leary, Ph.D., Ryland Hall 
320, University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia 23173. Email: dleary@richmond.edu 
1The classic branches of philosophical reflection are ontology, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, 
which deal respectively with the nature of being, truth, goodness, and beauty, all traditionally 
understood as having definitive, unchanging essences. James cared about each of these topics, 
but he was among the first to realize the revolutionary consequences of adopting a Darwinian 
worldview. These consequences included a shift from rationalistic analyses of static "being" to 
empirical investigations of dynamic "becoming" and the related recognition that truth, good· 
ness, and beauty - not just beings - assume a wide variety or plurality of forms in this world. 
(Therefore we should speak in the plural of different kinds of truths, goods, and beauties.) Also 
included among these consequences was the realization that any strict separation of the onto· 
logical, epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic dimensions of what Jam es called "the stream of 
experience" is somewhat artificial. As we shall see with regard to the key terms that I will use, 
James felt that ethical "values" derive at least in part from epistemological "visions" of the ways 
things are at a given moment in rime. 
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James hinted at the ethical dimension of pluralism when he criticized "monistic 
idealism" in A Pluralistic Universe Games, 1909/1977, pp. 27-28). Using an analogy, 
as he so often did, he suggested that those who believe that everything and every-
one in the universe - past, present, and to come - has a predetermined place in 
a single, unchanging, inexorable system, are like "readers" of a "cosmic novel" who 
believe that they can discern "the author's point of view," identify all the "villains" 
and "heroes," and anticipate every twist and turn of "the plot," even those still 
to come. This assumes, James pointed out, that the "world-drama" is "timeless" 
- that its script has already been written out in full and that it can and will be 
subject to absolutely no revision. As James put it elsewhere, the monists' story 
allows for no surprises, no novelties, and no possibilities: world history, like our 
individual biographies within it, represents the ineluctable unfolding of what must 
be Games, 1904-1905/1988b, p. 341; 1906--1907/1988c, pp. 424-427; 1907/1975, 
pp. 70-71; and 1911/1979c, pp. 76--79). 
But are we really mere readers of a story that has already been written, James 
went on to ask? Are we not ourselves "the very personages of the world-drama"? 
Don't we feel that we are involved day to day in an evolving and not fully deter-
mined story, as we interact with others "whom we help in their vicissitudes even 
as they help us in ours"? And don't we experience a very personal "satisfaction" 
when we aid one another - a kind of satisfaction that we would not feel if we 
sensed that our actions were as completely predetermined as the monists suggest? 
Surely the "absolute reality" that they posit would give us a different kind of feeling 
since we could "neither help nor hinder it" Games, 1909/1977, pp. 27-28). 
In contrast to the monists' story, James offered a belief in pluralism, which 
makes "the very life we lead seem real and earnest." For only in a world of "finite 
multifariousness" would "every end, reason, motive, object of desire or aversion, 
ground of sorrow or joy that we feel" actually matter. Only in such a world would 
"anything really happen" that had not been foreseen and foreordained from the 
beginning of time (p. 28). And, of course, only in such a world would our lives, 
choices, and actions deserve to be called ethical or unethical. 
The purpose of this article is to provide a quick survey of James's views on the plu-
rality of visions that humans have regarding reality, as a background for more exten-
sive discussions of his views on the plurality of values that orient human thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors, as well as his views on the enactment of those values through 
active resistance to the ways things are and the risk-taking involved in striving to 
improve the human condition. Consonant with pluralism itself, I intend this discus-
sion to open up rather than close off further considerations ofJames's views on ethics. 2 
21 will be pulling James's ethical views together from a variety of sources since they were never 
treated by him in a single, summative account. Indeed, it would have been contradictory - a 
"monistic" rather than "pluralistic" activity - for James to spell out, once and for all, a fully 
rationalized set of ethical principles and corollaries. (This would have suggested something 
that James rejected, namely, the primacy of a priori reason over a posteriori experience.) As we 
shall see, what James offered instead of preestablished principles were some core values on the 
footnote continued on next page )lo 
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Besides contributing to centennial reflections upon A Pluralistic Universe, this 
article also represents a partial response to an address presented by M. Brewster 
Smith at the 2008 convention of the American Psychological Association. The 
occasion of Smith's presentation, entitled "Toward Transcending Relativism: A 
Late-Life Perspective," was his well deserved reception of an Award for Distin-
guished Contribution to Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. The central 
concern that he raised in that address was the need for psychology and other dis-
ciplines to transcend relativism with regard to both knowledge and values. 
Interestingly, even though Smith indicated that he accepts the epistemological cri-
tiques of recent decades and therefore acknowledges that final, absolute truth is 
beyond human ken, he expressed confidence and apparent comfort with the idea 
that we can arrive at "useful approximations of truth" regarding the world and its 
inhabitants. (His position depends, in particular, on the use of multiple, overlap-
ping processes of corroboration.) However, Smith's confidence and comfort does 
not carry over to the relativity of values and the associated choices premised upon 
them. Indeed, he expressed considerable distress at our collective failure to clarify 
the nature and variety of values, and hence our difficulty in resolving the 
humane and ethical dilemmas that confront us as human beings and as practi-
tioners of human services and behavioral science. 
During Smith's address, I found myself wondering why many of us - not just 
Smith himself - have become reasonably comfortable with the notion that we 
can produce largely truthful, if not definitively true, statements about reality, yet 
still think of values - and yearn to make decisions - that are demonstrably 
" . h" h h " "7 Wh I f'd d . fi d ng t rat er t an wrong . y aren t we as con 1 ent an saus 1e to say 
that we can arrive, and perhaps have arrived, at "useful approximations of 
value"? Such questions led me to ask, What would William James say about 
this matter? This article is my initial attempt to answer these queries.3 
basis of which individuals might be inspired to take ethical risks in addressing what he called 
the ethical "demands" rather than "commands" posed by their real-life experiences. Because 
James never articulated a formal ethical system (though James, 1897/1979b and 1899/1983b, 
are particularly instructive with regard to his ethical sensibilities), I will speak of "ethics in a 
Jamesian key" rather than "Jamesian ethics." In so speaking, I will use "vision" and "values" as 
shorthand terms to epitomize a range of words that James used to express his epistemological 
and ethical views, and I will present my comments more as "reflections" than "analyses" since 
they will sometimes reach beyond what James actually wrote. Among those who have presented 
more formal analyses of James's moral or ethical thought are Brennan (1961), Bird (1997), 
Cooper (2002), Gale (1999), Perry (1935), Rambo (1980), Roth (1969), Slater (2007), and 
most notably Myers (1986). Cotkin's (1990) study ofJames's political views inevitably touches 
upon his moral and ethical thought. For an excellent introduction to James's life, times, and 
ways of thinking, including his moral and ethical concerns, see Richardson (2006). 
3The reasons I asked what James would say are fairly straightforward. (1) I have spent a good 
amount of time studying James's thought (see, e.g., Leary, 1990b, 1992, 1995, 2003, and in press), 
and I am currently writing a book on a neglected aspect of his life and work. (2) I was struck by 
the Jamesian quality of Smith's comments on knowledge and truthfulness. (3) I could not help 
wondering why a Jamesian approach to ethics would not satisfy Smith and others as much as a 
Jamesian approach to knowledge. 
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Visualizing the Ways Things Are 
From very early in his career, William James conceptualized knowledge in terms 
of visual metaphors. No doubt this reflected his previous experiences as an artist's 
apprentice (see Leary, 1992), but his metaphors were nonetheless more substantial 
and general in import than their status as figures of speech might suggest. James 
really believed and presented evidence to show that knowledge is perspectival: 
that the vision it provides is always achieved and expressed from a particular point 
of view. Thus, in one of his first publications, he argued that philosophy depends 
upon "the habit of always seeing an alternative, of not taking the usual for granted, 
of making conventionalities fluid again." When articulated in a coherent way, 
such alternatives provide "mental perspective" and communicate an "independent, 
personal look" at reality Games, 1876/1978a, pp. 4-5).4 
Of course, philosophy, like science, aims at more than individualized, personal 
perspectives. As a result, once an alternative perspective has been created by some-
one (through mental processes described by James, 1878/1983a and 1878/1978b), 
assurance of its relative validity must be provided by others who confirm that 
it has been useful in their own attempts to understand and deal with this or 
that aspect of reality. This verification through corroboration and adoption can 
happen formally, as in philosophical analysis and scientific experimentation, or 
less formally and even spontaneously. For, as James (1890/1981) said, while most 
individuals "have no eyes but for those aspects of things which they have already 
been taught to discern," virtually "any one of us can notice a phenomenon after 
it has once been pointed out" to us (Vol. 1, p. 420). In either case, the advancement 
of knowledge depends upon the acceptance of new ways of looking at reality that 
"work" in some tangible way.5 
"That James used visual metaphors derived from his own experience as an artist illustrates his con-
tention that everyone understands things from the perspective of his or her own past experience. 
Here is a relevant passage from A Pluralistic Universe (1909/1977): "No philosophy can ever be 
anything but a summary sketch, a picture of the world in abridgment, a foreshortened bird's-eye 
view of the perspective of events. And the first thing to notice is this, that the only material we 
have at our disposal for making a picture of the whole world is supplied by the various portions of 
that world of which we have already had experience. We can invent no new forms of conception, 
applicable to the whole exclusively, and not suggested originally by the parts. All philosophers, 
accordingly, have conceived of the whole world after the analogy of some particular feature of 
it which has particularly captivated their attention" (p. 9). In this regard, with reference to the 
fundamental contribution of what I call "comparative thinking" in psychology as well as philos-
ophy, see Leary (1990a). 
-'This is a highly abbreviated rendition of James's pragmatic theory of truth. Throughout this 
article I will avoid using special jargon related to James's radical empiricism and pragmatism, 
since I want to convey the central gist of his views through the kind of metaphors that he found 
instructive. Regarding James's reasons for adopting radical empiricism, which emphasizes the 
richly varied and deeply individualized nature of experience, see James (1912/1976); regarding 
James's reasons for adopting pragmatism, which posits that the survival of any perspective, and 
the use of the concepts and terms associated with it, should and does depend upon their prac-
tical utility, see James (1907/1975). 
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A great deal of James's intellectual work focused on elaborating and drawing 
conclusions from this basic understanding of knowledge as a special kind of 
shared vision. Whatever reality may be, our knowledge of it, James argued, is 
advanced by trying to see what it looks like from multiple perspectives. Some 
of these perspectives, or some combination of perspectives, will be found to be 
more useful than others; some, for instance, will be helpful in controlling as 
well as understanding an array of phenomena. Other perspectives, or visions, 
will have more delimited yet still meaningful utility, as they are applied to a 
narrower range of phenomena or to the needs of particular types of individuals. A 
well known example that James offered in The Principles of Psychology (1890/1981) 
makes this latter point as well as anything else: 
Let four men make a tour in Europe. One will bring home only picturesque impressions 
- costumes and colors, parks and views and works of architecture, pictures and statues. 
To another all this will be non-existent; and distances and prices, populations and 
drainage-arrangements, door- and window-fastenings, and other useful statistics will 
take their place. A third will give a rich account of the theatres, restaurants, and public 
balls, and naught beside; whilst the fourth will perhaps have been so wrapped in his own 
subjective broodings as to tell little more than a few names of places through which he 
passed. Each has selected, out of the same mass of presented objects, those which suited 
his private interest and has made his experience thereby. (Vol. l, pp. 275-276) 
Clearly, each of these individuals has seen reality in a "true" way, though each 
has also overlooked aspects of reality that others have noticed. James's point is 
that no one way of knowing reality, or visualizing experience, will obviate the pos-
sibility and need for other ways. No vision, however accurate, will be complete or 
final. The aesthete's interests will differ from the plumber's, the politician's 
from the physicist's, the economist's from the priest's.6 
Nevertheless, given our common sensory apparatus and typical modes of inter-
acting with the world, we can expect a certain convergence of visions - of how 
reality can be understood. Contrary to various simplifications of his thought, 
James was a realist, though far from a naive realist who expects every eye to 
observe reality from the same perspective, as if from everywhere or nowhere. In 
the end, as James pointed out, the inevitable variation of perspectives - the 
obvious plurality of human experiences - works to our common benefit. We can 
6J ames wrote many passages on this point. The following one, from a lecture subsequently pub-
lished in Pragmatism (1907 /1975), graphically underscores the interconnection between ontology 
and epistemology as well as the plurality of perspectives and resulting visions that James had in 
mind: "What shall we call a thing anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we carve out everything, 
just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes. For me, the whole 'audience' [to 
whom I am speaking) is one thing .... But in your own eyes, ladies and gentlemen, to call you 
'audience' is an accidental way of taking you. The permaneI}tly real things for you are your indi-
vidual persons. To an anatomist, again, those persons are but organisms, and the real things are 
the organs. Not the organs, so much as their constituent cells, says the histologists; not the cells, 
but their molecules, say in turn the chemists" (p. 122). 
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and do learn from one another, and we profit from what others point out to us: 
"We exchange ideas; we lend and borrow verifications, get them from one 
another by means of social discourse. All truth thus gets verbally built out, 
stored up, and made available for everyone" Oames, 1907/1975, p. 102). 
This active exchange of our visualizations of the ways things are, including 
our criticisms as well as corroborations of each other's perspectives, is what 
allows us, like Brewster Smith, to feel reasonably confident and comfortable 
with the knowledge that we have. It may not be perfect or definitive, but it has 
been tried and found reasonably reliable. It works to a very significant degree. 
And to the extent that it doesn't, it remains susceptible to improvement so 
long as motivated, discriminating, and creative individuals continue to explore 
and share alternative visions of what they have experienced. In addition, the 
fact that there are multiple ways of viewing the virtually limitless aspects of 
reality helps assure that we will be able to adapt our knowledge, as needed, to 
changing circumstances. With this truncated summary of James's views on 
human knowledge in mind, we are ready to reflect on ethics in a J amesian key. 
Visualizing the Ways Things Should and Should Not Be 
When William James asserted, inA Pluralistic Universe (1909/1977), that "a man's 
vision is the great fact about him'' (p. 14), his statement applied to ethics as much as 
epistemology. For even as he felt that vision was central to human knowledge, he was 
also convinced that it mattered in ethics. In fact, he had underscored this point ten 
years earlier in his essay "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings" (1899/1983c), 
which recounted some of the moral costs associated with not seeing the distinctive 
inner life and value of other individuals, especially those who are unlike ourselves 
and who enjoy and desire different things.7 This essay was one of James's favorite 
publications: "much more," he said, "than the mere piece of sentimentalism which it 
may seem to some readers." Instead, it expresses "a definite view of the world and of 
our moral relations to the same .... I mean the pluralistic or individualistic philos-
ophy." The consequence of this philosophy, he went on to say, is "the well-known 
democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality" Oames, 1899/1983b, p. 4). 
James's individualism has sometimes been interpreted as a justification for self-
ishly pursuing the fulfillment of one's own needs and desires, but that is a profound 
distortion of what he had in mind. As he argued in very explicit terms, only an indi-
vidual who suffers from a dehumanizing "blindness" to others will attend only to 
his or her own concerns. Anyone who truly values human dignity and respects 
what should be accorded to every hutnan being will recognize that each person has 
an inalienable right to be seen, and once seen to be heard and allowed to flourish. 
7The timeliness of James's concern is indicated by the fact that the first portion of this essay has 
been identified and republished as one of the first significant statements of multiculturalism by 
Sollors (1996, pp. 34-36). 
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A distinctive set of implications follows from this radical individualism: an 
individualism that, as James insisted, should be applied across the entire spec-
trum of human beings. Chief among them is the realization that "neither the 
whole of truth, nor the whole of good, is revealed to any single observer." And 
beyond that, that "each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the 
peculiar position in which he [or she] stands" (1899/1983c, p. 149). 
This insight was the kernel of the contention James expressed several years 
later, that not only must we "borrow from the other parts of truth seen better 
from the other's point of view," but we must also realize that each of us, "from 
his [or her] particular angle of observation, takes in a certain sphere of fact and 
trouble, which each must deal with in a unique manner." And therefore, since 
each of us expresses but "a syllable in human nature's total message," we must 
all act with an awareness that "it takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out 
completely" Qames, 1902/1985, pp. 383-384).8 
Although we might be comfortable with the idea that each of us has a unique 
epistemic privilege, particularly with regard to our own individual experience, we 
are less likely to be comfortable with the demands placed upon us if we take J ames's 
ethical views seriously. For if I see something that you do not - a way things 
should or should not be - I may be called upon to act on my own, without your 
understanding, assistance, or approval.9 As James said to those of us who feel com-
pelled to find ways to end warfare and physical aggression as means of resolving 
international and interpersonal conflicts, we should not expect our efforts to be as 
easy and enjoyable as a "camping party" Oames, 1910/1982, p. 162).10 At some 
points, at least, we will be going against public opinion, not to mention the tide 
of human history and habitual behavior. As James suggested in a companion 
piece to his essay on human blindness, it has taken "exceptional individuals" 
8Note that if this is "relativism," it is a relativism that emphasizes a cumulative and supplemental 
rather than conflictual and otherwise problematic plurality of views and values. But note, too, that 
James did not deny that actual as well as potential conflicts are part of what humans must 
acknowledge, endure, and try to resolve. That was part of his message in his essay on human blind-
ness Oames, 1899/1983c), as he strove to make it clear that the ethical criterion for judging potential 
resolutions should be whether or not they would create a better world for all. Individuals might 
argue about what that would be - what a better world would look like - but it should be the 
ideal vanishing point for conversation and convergence. 
9 A moral question, after all, will not allow and, in any case, cannot await an answer for which any· 
thing like proof is available. As James (1897 /1979a) put it, moral issues pose "a question not of 
what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell us what 
exists; but to compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we must consult 
not science, but what Pascal calls our heart" (p. 27). The major burden ofJames's famous essay on 
"The Will to Believe," from which this quotation is taken, is that it is only through someone's 
believing and then acting in light of a given value that the value can and will be actualized. 
101 haven't made up this example. I am quoting directly from James's essay on "The Moral Equivalent 
of War," which calls for an end to war and aggression as means of achieving human goals, 
whether those goals be laudable or not. James foreshadowed his criticism of "the barbaric tendencies 
in men" in The Varieties of Religious Experience Qames, 1902/1985, pp. 291-296). 
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throughout history to fight for significant, previously unenvisioned ethical ends: 
individuals who have had to work and endure "in obedience to some inner ideal, 
while their comrades were not actuated by anything worthy of that name" 
(James, 1899/1983d, p. 161). Now as then, actualizing such ideals will take not 
only moral courage but a commitment to what James often called "the strenuous 
life" (e.g., James, 1897/1979b, pp. 159-162, and 1902/1985, p. 292). 
This is where the burden of ethical individualism comes in: the consciences of 
radical individualists - of those who accept their own responsibilities as well as 
acknowledge the right of every other individual to dignity and well-being -
should dictate that they act, with others if possible but alone if necessary, according 
to what they see as the ways things should or should not be. As with those who 
pursue truth in its more purely cognitive manifestations, they may discover in 
time that some other view or related value should supersede their own, but in the 
meantime they ought to act as their conscience dictates. Humans are no more 
infallible - their visions are no more final - in moral than in epistemological sit-
uations. As James put it in an earlier essay, "there is no such thing possible as an 
ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance .... There can be no final 
truth in ethics any more than in physics, until the last man has had his experience 
and said his say" Games, 1897/1979b, p. 141).11 
Nevertheless James was convinced, and offered historical evidence to support 
his view, that the long-term, if not short-term consequences of individuals acting 
in response to strongly felt (what he called "tyrannical") moral imperatives -
including the actions of saints who were considered silly or mad in their own 
lifetimes - are more likely than not to advance the common good (see James, 
1897/1979b, p. 159, and 1902/1985, pp. 262-300). In any case, whatever truth 
and goodness human beings can create or comprehend ultimately depends, 
James said, upon the shared visions and actions of all. And just as he main-
tained that "the main categories of thought" have emerged and will continue to 
develop "in the course of experience itself" Games, 1912/1976, p. 131), so too 
he believed that the main categories of value have emerged and will continue 
to develop over the course of human history. Which means that some values or 
modifications of values have not yet been envisioned, much less enacted. They 
await an advocate who sees something that should or should not be. 
Meanwhile, the best practical advice that James could offer in his article on 
"The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" (1897 /1979b) was that we should 
try "to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can," realizing our own ideals, 
so far as possible, in a manner that "will also satisfy the alien demands.'' "That 
11Just as James (1909/1977) criticized "vicious intellectualism" as a kind of preemptive strike against 
those who believe that there will always be facts that do not fit perfectly within any given philo· 
sophical system (p. 32), so he could have spoken against a "vicious moralism" that denies the pos· 
sibility of signiilcantly modified or entirely new kinds of moral situations and dilemmas. "Philosophy," after 
all, "lives in words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation" 
(James, 1902/1985, p. 360). 
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and that only," he said, "is the path of peace" (p. 155). So, the appropriately 
moral individual "must vote always for the richer universe," the one that fulfills 
the needs and wishes of as many individuals as possible, though "which particular 
universe this is he cannot know for certain in advance; he only knows that if he 
makes a bad mistake the cries of the wounded will soon inform him of the fact" (p. 
158). When such cries are heard, of course, the moral individual should change 
the way he votes and acts, ifhe can, since the "one unconditional commandment" 
is "so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good 
which we can see" (p. 158) .12 
Resisting, Risking, and Changing the Ways Things Are 
William James recognized that religious belief would provide a firmer basis for 
arguments about ethical responsibility, but he was never able to muster sufficient 
confidence to make a leap into supernatural faith. As a result, his arguments for 
living "strenuously" had to be based on resolutely secular beliefs in the native abil-
ity and inclination of human beings to assume responsibility for themselves and 
others. Among the conceptual sources of those beliefs, for James, was Ralph Waldo 
Emerson's (1841/1983) assessment of the possibility and need for "self-reliance." 
Even more deeply, however, James's ethical premises were rooted in his own expe-
riences of resistance to claims that human existence - his own individual exis-
tence as well as the existence of all other humans - was ultimately meaningless. 
It would be meaningless, he felt, if he and others were but spume on the wave of 
12James sometimes spoke of a "demand" rather than "good" in order to convey the imperative 
quality associated with realizing the way things should be, as when one realizes that a particular 
social arrangement really should exist or that a particular action should be undertaken. James used 
the metaphor of "voting" in these passages to indicate that in acting this or that way an individual 
is, in essence, casting his lot for this or that kind of moral universe. James's statement about 
attending to "the cries of the wounded" may seem flippant if it is taken to be a mere rhetorical 
flourish. But as he demonstrated in "On a Certain Blindness of Human Beings" (1899/1983c), he 
meant it very sincerely. This does not mean that he himself always attended to every cry; he has 
been criticized, with some justice, for this or that deafness or personal blind spot (see, e.g., 
Garrison and Madden, 1977, and Otto, 1943). No one, after all, can see all things and all people 
all the time. Generally, however, he has been recognized as an unusually sensitive and sympathetic 
individual. Perhaps I should add, in this context, that James extended his ethical concern to non-
human animals, as exemplified by the fact that he told his students, however whimsically, that 
ours cannot be the best of all possible worlds, as monistic idealists must perforce claim, as long as 
there is "a single cockroach suffering the pangs of unrequited love" (Train, 1943, p. 4; also reported 
in Hapgood, 1939, pp. 67 and 78). More seriously, James's concern about animals prompted him 
to reflect upon the ethics of experimental vivisection. Although he welcomed the scrutiny of the 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals as a way of keeping physiologists vigilant and 
assuring that they will be prosecuted for any untoward behavior, he concluded that vivisection 
is warranted if there are potential benefits for humans and if animals receive humane treatment 
(James, 1875/1987a and 1876/1987b). He was, in short, a cautious, qualified proponent. (I 
should note that he was also an experimental physiologist by training.) James acknowledged his 
colleague Josiah Royce as the source of his notion that the variety of "goods" should be maxi-
mized (see 1888-1889/1988a, p. 185). 
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history, as materialist science suggested: if, as he put it, "we are Nature through and 
through'' and hence "wholly conditioned," so that "not a wiggle of our will happens 
save as a result of physical laws" (James, 1869/1995b, p. 370). 
For many years James struggled against fears that this might be the case, but 
on April 30, 1870, he performed his famous Emersonian act of self-assertion, 
expressing his definitive resistance to the postulate of determinism and staking 
his future on the will to believe that his thoughts, feelings, and behavior were not 
entirely the result of physical forces. 13 However limited the wiggling of his will 
might be, he chose to assert its efficacy, and for him this assertion - and related 
beliefs - made all the difference in the world. From that point on, he was com-
mitted to expressing his freedom and individuality through a concentration of 
attention, effort, and action, trusting that he could indeed become a genuine 
factor - which is to say, an ethical agent - in the course of human history. It 
all depended, he concluded, on committing his life to "the self-governing resist-
ance of the ego to the world" (James, 1870, p. 84). 
What exactly did that mean for James? For one thing, it did not mean that resist-
ance to the world was to be based solely on the ego's self-interest. As early as the 
tender age of 16, James had averred that "we must all lead an active life and live 
for others, not for ourselves" (James, 1858/1995a, p. 13). So resistance to the 
world, according to James, must entail attention to others and opposition to any-
thing that negatively affects their dignity, development, and well-being. This is 
consistent, of course, with the central premises that we have already encountered 
in James's later thoughts about ethical behavior. In addition, James said, we must 
lead "an active life" as opposed to the kind of existence he himself had been living 
in the years leading up to April 30, 1870: an existence that consisted primarily of 
wallowing in thought rather than engaging in action. An active life, then, is one in 
which a person's "powers of action" are not endangered by a surfeit of "mere spec-
ulations and contemplative Grubelei [musing]" (James, 1870, p. 82). 
And beyond calling for a proactive style of living, James recognized that actions 
intended to change the status quo in the interest of improving human lives will 
necessarily be unconventional at times, and as such will be risky. After all, conven-
tional behavior, by definition, both reinforces and is reinforced by the ways things 
are. But for James, the risk of going against customary ways was a positive, not neg-
ative thing. Even at the level of personal experience, an awareness of risk was not 
anxiety-provoking for him. To the contrary, as he admitted to his wife-to-be in 1877, 
he never felt more "deeply and intensely active & alive" than when he was engaged 
in a meaningful, risky act in which there was "an element of active tension, of hold-
13James's assertion of his own free will, and his consequent decision to live as if he were free for 
the coming year in order to see what the results might be, is often attributed to his reading and 
reflecrion on the philosophy of Charles Renouvier. No doubt that was a factor, as James (1870) 
himself reported. But there is good reason to characterize his act of believing as an example of the 
kind of self-assertion that Emerson (1841/1983) had described as a requirement of true selfhood. 
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ing my own as it were," "without any guarantee" regarding the outcome. Indeed, 
"make a guarantee," James said, "and the attitude immediately becomes to my con-
sciousness stagnant and stingless" Oames, 1877/1995c, pp. 570-571). 
Many of James's early letters and diaries celebrate risk-taking for adding zest 
as well as opportunities to life. Conversely, other letters and documents report 
James's tendency toward boredom when he was in safe and hence unexciting 
environments and occupations. A good example is provided by his reaction to a 
Chautauqua Assembly in the late 1890s. James chafed at the "ice-cream soda-
water" world that he experienced there. It was a world, he said, that removed all 
occasions for ethical heroism by papering over the ethical challenges that existed 
outside its walls. He felt uncomfortable in such worlds and in any situation that 
excluded, or tried to exclude, the plurality of experience, especially those aspects 
of experience that were novel, difficult, or what he called "wild" Oames, 1899/1983d, 
pp. 152-154). The way he saw it, "all the higher, more penetrating ideals are 
revolutionary," and he therefore welcomed the fact that "every now and then" 
someone will come along and assert "the right to be original." At that point, "rev-
olutionary thought or action" is likely to take place, thus making possible the 
production of some new "fruit." In James's estimation, it is only with such 
novel thought or action that there will be a chance for old ways to be replaced 
by something better (James, 1897/1979b, p. 157). 
Yet even when such positive changes are wrought, the perpetrator of the new 
good, even if he or she is "an out-and-out saint," will have been working "at his 
[or her] peril" (James, 1902/1985, p. 298). Doing and creating good, in other 
words, is not for those who wish to avoid risk and the corresponding possibility 
of personal difficulty, perhaps even personal harm. "The highest ethical life," 
after all, "consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown too 
narrow for the actual case." And "however few may be called to bear its burdens" 
- and however many fewer will actually end up daring to act, albeit "with fear 
and trembling" - it is only through the risky responses of such individuals to 
the ethical imperatives that they feel, that the world and its inhabitants will 
enjoy the possibility of better days Oames, 1897 /1979b, p. 158) .14 
14James's use of "fear and trembling" recalls S~ren Kierkegaard's (1843/1941) consideration of the 
same ethical question: whether and when someone, in obedience to some higher calling, has the right 
or even obligation to violate established laws. Although James was not familiar with Kierkegaard's 
work when he used this phrase, he took the phrase from the same source as Kierkegaard, namely, 
from St. Paul's letter to the Philippians: "Wherefore, my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as 
in my presence only, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and 
trembling" (King James version, 2:21). The implied ethical insight is that if one has a deeply ethical 
nature - if one typically obeys moral commandments even when moral authorities will not know 
- then one can be trusted to work out his or her own alternative course of action when it seems 
fit to do so. This is equivalent to an ethical principle that James explicitly endorsed in The Varieties 
of Religious Experience (1902/1985), namely, Saint Augustine's maxim that ''if you only love God 
enough, you may safely follow all your inclinations" (p. 288). James said of this "antinomian saying" 
that it "is morally one of the profoundest of observations" even though "it is pregnant, for such persons, 
with passports beyond the bounds of conventional morality" (p. 72). 
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So, for James, it is through resistance to the ways things are, manifested in 
ethical action, that we can earn "the chance of salvation," understood in a 
purely secular sense. Having this chance and taking advantage of it, without 
any assurances, was "enough" for him, James said, and he believed that it was 
enough for others, too, since "no fact in human nature is more characteristic 
than its willingness to live on a chance." It is just this element of having a 
chance, an opportunity, a fresh possibility in life, James emphasized, that dis-
tinguishes "a life of which the keynote is resignation" from "a life of which the 
keynote is hope" Oames, 1902/1985, p. 414). 
In the end, then, ethics is the science and practice of hope - and action -
for a better world. Summing everything up, ethics rests on the assertion of per-
sonal freedom and responsibility in the advancement of values based on visions 
of the ways things should be. No matter how clear or unclear one's vision may 
be, the assumption of ethical responsibility involves resistance to the way the 
world is and acceptance of the personal risk entailed in trying to change it for the 
better. These characteristics - resistance and risk - can be used to contrast 
epistemology and ethics in a way that is germane to Brewster Smith's concerns, 
which were outlined in the introduction to this article. 
The Real World, the Possible World, and Brewster Smith's Concerns 
Let's take stock. We have seen that the physical aspects of the world, according 
to James, are available to us cognitively through this or that way of seeing. All 
such seeing is necessarily from this or that perspective. When a new perspective 
is tried but found to yield no tangible benefit over an already established way of 
seeing, it is likely to be overlooked. Hence, whatever counts as knowledge at any 
given time is simply the way of seeing that has proven to be most useful to the 
greatest number of individuals who are hoping to achieve a particular kind of 
purchase upon reality. But. at any moment knowledge can change as a result of 
continuing feedback from experience. As James summed the matter up, the truth 
about the world, so far as we can know it, is what we are fated to believe, given 
the resistance of the world to our attempts to see it otherwise. 15 
15James elaborated on "the presence of resisting factors in every actual experience of truth-making" 
in Pragmatism (1907/1975). After defining truths as "beliefs about 'Reality,"' he defined reality 
as "what truths have to take account of" (p. 117). In focusing in this final section of my article 
on knowledge of the physical world as opposed to ethics in the social world, I am obviously sim-
plifying matters so that I can more readily separate the core differences between epistemology 
and ethics. Still, I should note that epistemology is as concerned with knowing social facts as 
physical facts. Similarly, ethics can and often does involve physical as well as social facts, though 
primarily with regard to whether or not they can and should be preserved or changed. For 
instance, the possibility of changes in physical arrangements becomes relevant to ethics when 
such changes may impinge upon the social world: most would agree that it would be unethical 
not to repair a dam when repairs can be made and when not making them will result, sooner or 
later, in human tragedy. 
VISIONS AND VALUES 133 
When it comes to ethics, however, the direction of resistance is different. 
Rather than bacteria or nebulae or some other entity resisting our inaccurate 
visions, it is we who resist the constitution or procedures of social life. It is we, 
not the world, who provide the relevant point of reference. And whenever we 
resist the ways that society tries to impose upon us, we leave the realm of epis-
temology, with its recording of how things are, and enter the realm of ethics, 
with its assessment of how things should be. 
If the human need to conform to the ineluctable requirements of physical 
life motivates our quest for knowledge of "the real world," it is our human 
desire to flourish- to develop and to live a good life - that spurs the discovery 
and then the enactment of values that promise to create "the possible world." 
And it is precisely in our confrontation with possibility, James felt, that our 
fullest measure as human beings is taken. For possibility is the essential mark of 
ethical life, just as it is part and parcel of the pluralist worldview in general, along 
with "incompleteness, 'more,' uncertainty, insecurity" as well as "fact, novelty, 
compromise, remedy, success" and such contrasts as "better and worse" and "loss 
and gain" Oames, 1906-1907/1988c, p. 426). 
Reflection on this litany suggests the source of Brewster Smith's discomfort 
with the plurality of values in the world. Possibilities may be exciting, but they 
are associated with loss as well as gain, failure as well as success. As we have 
seen, James believed that when it comes to choosing among alternative possi-
bilities, there are no absolute guarantees regarding outcomes, however much 
we might wish that there were. Acting responsibly, if it involves a true choice, 
is not acting with certainty. And whereas uncertainty is also involved in epis-
temological conjectures - in positing beliefs about "the real world" - there 
is a qualitative difference in the uncertainty that attends ethical action on 
behalf of "the possible world." After all, in ethical activity, one makes a deeper 
and more personal investment, one that is subject to the moral approbation or 
condemnation of self as well as others. As James argued in The Principles of 
Psychology (1890/1981), when one makes a serious ethical choice one not only 
chooses between two or more possible future worlds, but also between two or 
more possible future selves. To a significant extent, what an ethical agent "shall 
become is fixed by the conduct of this moment" (Vol. 1, p. 276). Thus, in "critical 
ethical moments," the issue is not simply "what act he {or she] shall now choose 
to do," but "what being he [or she] shall now resolve to become" {p. 277). 
So, a great deal is involved, as James insisted, when we are asked "the most 
probing question we are ever asked," namely, "Will you or won't you have it sol" And 
we answer this question, James noted, 
by consents or non-consents and not by words. What wonder that these dumb responses 
should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things! What won-
der if the effort demanded by them be the measure of our worth as men! What wonder if 
the amount which we accord of it be the one strictly underived and original contribution 
which we make to the world! (Vol. 2, p. 1182) 
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Realizing the extent of our investment in how things are and how they should 
be will help us understand the kind of discomfort that Brewster Smith reported 
regarding the plurality of values and the need to choose among them. Such dis-
comfort is natural, especially when the stakes are high, but more pertinently, it 
may be a necessary prerequisite for the kind of strenuous and even heroic 
action that has the potential to make the greatest positive difference. For if we 
are true pluralists rather than closet monists - if we recognize the diversity of 
visions, values, and possible futures that confront us - all we can do is accept 
or reject the freedom to risk enacting the value that is most imperative at a 
given moment. The crucial question, in the end, is whether our behavior will 
take the course of least resistance or resist social pressure for the sake of risking 
action that enacts rather than violates a deeply held value. 
Of course, someone could accept James's depiction of the heroic nature of 
difficult ethical decisions and actions, and still feel uncomfortable about the 
seemingly unbridled relativity of values underlying potential human action. 
Couldn't someone who accepted James's way of envisioning ethical behavior 
feel warranted in doing anything he or she feels like doing in a particular situa-
tion? Is there no criterion that could be used to adjudicate his or her current 
and future behaviors? 
In fact, there is a criterion - a pragmatic criterion - even, or especially, 
when one is confronted with a diversity of values. This criterion can guide the 
selection and retention of values. Initially, after all, values simply emerge in the 
stream of experience. Something is experienced as positive or negative, con-
structive or destructive, good or bad, right or wrong. (Such valuing, James felt, 
is an intimate and immediate aspect of our ongoing experience.) But when a 
value leads to an action, and that action to an outcome, an assessment of that 
outcome will then allow us to affirm, negate, or qualify the ethical efficacy of the 
value that initiated the process, just as surely as the cognitive outcome of a par-
ticular vision of reality will allow us to affirm, negate, or qualify its epistemic 
validity. Only if there is an actual plurality of values as well as genuinely possible 
alternative actions does such testing make sense, and this testing, James argued, 
is a good as well as necessary thing: it is the sine qua non for ethical contention, 
evaluation, and action within the context of the current, existential situation. 
In essence, prior to acting, an ethical person will ask, implicitly or explicitly, 
Will or won't acting in light of this particular value contribute to the improvement 
of life for myself and for others? And after acting, the same person will ask, Did 
OT didn't my action contribute to the improvement of life for myself and for 
others? Further, Did this action affirm the dignity of myself and others? And 
yet further, Did it enhance the well-being of the larger community, including 
those who have typically fallen outside the bounds of my normal daily life? 
Ethical reflection in a Jamesian key would revolve around questions like 
these, the underlying assumption being that the same basic process that works 
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for epistemology (examining and selecting visions that seem to work better) will 
also work for ethics (examining and selecting values that seem to work better). 
Unquestionably the assessment of outcomes and the consequent reconsideration 
of initiating values will be contentious at times, but so too will be the sorting 
through and selecting of visions regarding the nature of the world as it exists 
at this moment. Over the long run, persons of good will, who are not blind to 
the needs and desires of others, will enact values that promise to enhance 
human life, so that overlooked individuals as well as themselves and their com-
munities will enjoy good lives. 16 
Without a doubt, these ethical reflections represent an act of faith: a will to 
believe that beyond all the variations in human motives and ideals, human 
beings share a fundamental tendency to envision, and a fundamental desire to 
create, a good life for themselves and others. Not knowing for certain, ahead 
of time, exactly what a good life would look like - and not knowing for cer-
tain which version of that life is actually possible for tomorrow or the day after 
- we humans will necessarily have to continue testing our values in and 
through our actions, but as James pointed out, there are reasonable grounds for 
us to conduct this testing with hope rather than resignation. After all, the same 
diversity of values that can sometimes arouse discomfort also makes possible a 
better, more inclusive, and more satisfying future for all. 
16The notion of "testing" values is consonant with Anthony Appiah's (2008) concept of "experi· 
ments in ethics." Appiah's ethical reflections are consistent with James's pluralism, as one might 
expect since he, like James, starts from some of John Stuart Mill's premises (see Appiah, 2005 and 
2006). It is telling and appropriate that Appiah (2008) ends his most recent ethical considerations 
with a section on "complications." "My philosophy," he notes, "is that everything is more compli· 
cated than you thought" (p. 198). Nonetheless, he suggests that really seeing others (not being 
blind to them, as James would say) is to see, at minimum, that "each other person" is not just 
"someone with preferences, pleasures, and pains" but also, primarily, "a creature engaged in the 
project of making a life, striving to succeed on the basis of standards that are partly found and partly 
made .... The central thing that people are up to," he says, "is making a life. That is the human 
telos: to make a good life." This is something that humans must do in concert rather than conflict 
if they wish to be successful at it. And "precisely because making a life is an activity," Appiah 
writes, we should "expect to learn more from experiments in living than from experiments in phi· 
losophizing" (p. 203). Appiah's ethical discussions, like James's, raise issues that are echoed in 
Flanagan's (1991) views on "moral personality" and Wall's (2005) discussion of"moral creativity." 
And it is worth noting the ethical experimentation they both endorse can take the form of 
"thought experiments," such as those offered in literature. Coles's (1989) discussion of"the call of 
stories," Nussbaum's (1995) treatment of "poetic justice," and Johnson's (1993) plea for "moral 
imagination" address this important theme, while James himself (1897 /1979b) noted that "novels 
and dramas of the deeper sort" are relevant to reflections on "the moral life," especially to the 
extent that they are "confessedly tentative and suggestive rather than dogmatic" (p. 159). Both 
ethical ideals and practical solutions can be explored as one reads and reflects on literature, for the 
stories presented in literature not only "cultivate our ability to see and care for particulars" 
(Nussbaum, 1990, p. 184) but also allow us to experience what it is like ro search for "the morally 
salient" (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 14). It is relevant to note that James was inspired by literature in this 
way and that one of his students, George Herbert Mead (1913/1964), observed how "the modern 
western world has lately done much of its thinking [about the nature and challenges of human life] 
in the form of the novel" (p. 14 7). 
136 LEARY 
References 
Appiah, K.A. (2005). The ethics of identity. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Appiah, K.A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Appiah, K.A. (2008). Experiments in ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Bird, G.H. (1997). Moral philosophy and the development of morality. In R.A. Putnam (Ed.), The 
Cambridge companion io William James (pp. 260-281). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brennan, B.P. (1961). The ethics of William James. New York: Bookman Associates. 
Coles, R. (1989). The call of stories: Teaching and the moral imagination. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
Cooper, W. (2002). The unity of William}ames's thought. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University 
Press. 
Catkin, G. (1990). William]ames, public philosopher. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Emerson, R.W. (1983). Self-reliance. InJ. Porte (Ed.), Essays and lectures (pp. 259-282). New York: 
The Library of America. (Original work published 1841) 
Flanagan, 0. (1991). Varieties of moral personality: Ethics and psychological realism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
Gale, R.M. (1999). The divided self of William James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Garrison, G.A., and Madden, E.H. (1977). William James -warts and all. American Quarterly 29, 
206-228. 
Hapgood, H. (1939). A Victorian in the modem world. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington 
Press. 
James, W. (1870). Diary entry for April 30, 1870. In Diary l (1868-1873). William James Papers, 
Houghton Library, Harvard University. (b MS Am 1092.9 - 4550) 
James, W. (1975). Pragmatism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original 
work published 1907) 
James, W. (1976). Essays in radical empiricism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
(Original work published 1912) 
James, W. (1977). A pluralistic universe. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
(Original work published 1909) 
James, W. (1978a). The teaching of philosophy in our colleges. In E Burkhardt (Ed.), Essays in phi-
1.osophy (pp. 3-6). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original work pub-
lished 1876) 
James, W. (1978b). Remarks on Spencer's definition of mind as correspondence. In E Burkhardt 
(Ed.), Essays in phil.osophy (pp. 7-22). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
(Original work published 1878) 
James, W. (1979a). The will to believe. In E Burkhardt (Ed.), The will to believe and other essays in 
popular philosophy (pp. 13-33). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original 
work published 1897) 
James, W. (1979b). The moral philosopher and the moral life. In F. Burkhardt (Ed.), The will to 
believe and other essays in popular philosophy (pp. 141-162). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. (Original work published 1897) 
James, W. (1979c). Some problems of philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. (Original work published 1911) 
James, W. ( 1981). The principles of ps:ycholngy (3 vols.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. (Original work published 1890) 
James, W. (1982). The moral equivalent of war. In R Burkhardt (Ed.), Essays in religion and moral-
ity (pp. 162-17 3). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original work pub-
lished 1910) 
James, W. (1983a). Brute and human intellect. In E Burkhardt (Ed.), Essays in ps:ycholngy (pp. 
1-37). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1878) 
James, W. (I983b). Talks to teachers on psychology and io students on some of life's ideals. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1899) 
VISIONS AND VALUES 137 
James, W. (1983c). On a certain blindness in human beings. In F. Burkhardt (Ed.), Talks to teachers 
on psycholo!iJ and to students on some of Ufe's ideals (pp. 132-149). Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1899) 
James, W. (1983d). What makes a life significant. In F. Burkhardt (Ed.), Talks to teachers on psy-
chology and to students on some of life's ideals (pp. 150-167). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. (Original work published 1899) 
James, W. (1985). The varieties of religious experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. (Original work published 1902) 
James, W. (1987a). Vivisection. In F. Burkhardt (Ed.), Essays, comments, and reviews (pp. 10-13). 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1875) 
James, W. (1987b). More on vivisection. In F. Burkhardt (Ed.), Essays, comments, and reviews (pp. 
18-19). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1876) 
James, W. (1988a). Notes for philosophy 4: Ethics - recent English contributions to theistic 
ethics. In F. Burkhardt (Ed.), Manuscript lectures (pp. 182-186). Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. (Original lectures presented 1888-1889) 
James, W. (1988b). Notes for philosophy 9: Metaphysics. In F. Burkhardt (Ed.), Manuscript lectures 
(pp. 327-347). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Original lectures pre-
sented 1904-1905) 
James, W. (1988c). Syllabus in philosophy D: General problems of philosophy. In F. Burkhardt 
(Ed.), Manuscript lectures (pp. 378--428). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
(Original lectures presented 1906-1907) 
James, W. (1995a). Letter to Edgar Beach Van Winkle. In I. Skrupskelis and E.M. Berkeley (Eds.), 
Correspondence of William James (Vol. 4, pp. 11-16). Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press 
of Virginia. (Original work written March 1, 1858) 
James, W. (1995b). Letter to Thomas Wren Ward. In I. Skrupskelis and E.M. Berkeley (Eds.), 
Correspondence of William James (Vol. 4, pp. 369-371). Charlottesville, Virginia: University 
Press of Virginia. (Original work written March, 1869) 
James, W. (1995c). Letter to Alice Howe Gibbens Uames]. In I. Skrupskelis and E.M. Berkeley 
(Eds.), Correspondence of William James (Vol. 4, pp. 570-572). Charlottesville, Virginia: 
University Press of Virginia. (Original work written June 7, 1877) 
Johnson, M. (1993). Moml imagination: Implications of cognitive science for ethics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Kierkegaard, S. {1941). Fear and trembling. In Fear and trembling and the sickness unto death [W. 
Lowrie, Trans.] (pp. 21-132). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. (Original 
work published 1843) 
Leary, D.E. (1990a). Psyche's muse: The role of metaphor in the history of psychology. In D.E. 
Leary (Ed.), Metaphors in the history of psychololiY (pp. 1-78). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Leary, D.E. (1990b). William James on the self and personality: Clearing the ground for subsequent 
theorists, researchers, and practitioners. In M.G. Johnson and T.B. Henley (Eds.), Reflections on 
The principles of psychology: William James after a century (pp. 101-137). Hillsdale, New Jersey: 
Erlbaum. 
Leary, D.E. (1992). William James and the art of human understanding. American Psychologist, 47, 
152-160. 
Leary, D.E. (1995). William James, the psychologist's dilemma, and the historiography of psychology: 
Cautionary tales. History of the Human Sciences, 8, 91-105. 
Leary, D.E. (2003). A profound and radical change: How William James inspired a reshaping of 
American psychology. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.), The anatomy of impact: What makes the great works 
of psycholo!iJ great! (pp. 19--42). Washington, District of Columbia: American Psychological 
Association. 
Leary, D.E. (in press). Instead of Erklaren and Verstehen: William James on human understanding. 
In U. Feest (Ed.), Historical perspectives on Erklaren and Verstehen. New York. Springer Verlag. 
Mead, G.H. (1964). The social self. In A.J. Reck (Ed.), Selected writings (pp. 142-149). Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company. (Original work published 1913) 
Myers, G.E. (1986). William James: His life and thought. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press. 
138 LEARY 
Nussbaum, M.C. (1990). Love's knowledge: Essays on philosophy and literature. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Nussbaum, M.C. (1995). Poetic justice: The literary imagination and public life. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Nussbaum, M.C. (2001). The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy 
(revised edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Otto, M.C. (1943). On a certain blindness in William James. Ethics, 53, 184-191. 
Perry, R.B. (1935). The thought and character of William James (Z vols.). Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company. 
Rambo, LR. (1980). Ethics, evolution, and the psychology of William James. Journal of the History 
of the Behavioral Sciences, 16, 50-57. 
Richardson, R.D. (2006). William James: In the maelstrom of American modernity. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company. 
Roth, J.K. (1969). Freedom and the moral life: The ethics of William James. Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press. 
Slater, M.R. (2007). Ethical naturalism and religious belief in "The Moral Philosopher and the 
Moral Life." William James Studies, 2(1). Retrieved February 5, 2009, from http://williamjames 
studies.press.uiuc.edu/2.1/slater.html 
Smith, M.B. (2008, August). Toward transcending relativism: A late-life perspective. Invited address 
presented before the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology at the annual con-
vention of the American Psychological Association, Boston. 
Sollors, W. (Ed.). (1996). Theories of ethnicity: A classical reader. New York: New York University 
Press. 
Train, A. (1943). Yankee lawyer. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 
Wall, J. (2005). Moral creativity: Paul Ricoeur and the poetics of possibility. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
